Estimating the probability of the Ukraine war concluding in 2025 requires a comprehensive analysis of various factors, including military capabilities, economic conditions, diplomatic efforts, and the assessments of superforecasters, experts, and prediction markets. As of December 18, 2024, there is no single, definitive answer, but a range of probabilities and contributing factors can be identified.
Superforecasters, known for their accuracy in geopolitical forecasting, offer nuanced perspectives. While specific probabilities for the war ending in 2025 vary, a consensus emerges around a 35% to 65% likelihood. Good Judgment Inc., a leading platform for superforecasting, estimates a 55-65% probability that the war will reach a resolution by the end of 2025. This resolution could take the form of a ceasefire, a peace agreement, or a significant de-escalation. However, other superforecaster estimates, such as those from Good Judgment Open, place the probability lower, around 35-40%. This difference highlights the inherent uncertainty and the range of possible outcomes.
Key drivers influencing these estimates include:
Expert analyses from various think tanks and institutions provide additional insights into the likelihood of the war ending in 2025. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identified 2025 as a potential “year of decision” for the conflict, noting that both Ukraine and Russia are nearing the limits of their economic and military capacities. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) suggests a 60% likelihood of the war ending in 2025, while the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) warns that Ukraine could lose the war by 2025 if its current strategic trajectory does not change. These varying perspectives underscore the complexity of the situation and the range of potential outcomes.
Key expert insights include:
Amos C. Fox, in his analysis for the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), argues that Russia currently holds the upper hand due to its control over key territories, suggesting that the conflict is unlikely to end in 2025 without a dramatic shift in military dynamics or international mediation. Zalmay Khalilzad, writing for The National Interest, outlines both pro- and con-end factors for 2025, noting that while Ukraine's military moves have demonstrated Russia's vulnerabilities, the "huge gap" between Putin and Zelensky on acceptable terms remains a major barrier. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, in their report for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), project that the war could extend into 2025 and beyond unless Ukraine receives substantial military reinforcements or Russia faces internal collapse.
Prediction markets, which aggregate the views of participants who bet on outcomes, provide a real-time gauge of probabilities. Polymarket shows a 58% probability that the Ukraine war will end by December 31, 2025, while Metaculus estimates a 65% chance of resolution by the end of 2025. However, Manifold Markets gives a much lower estimate of 1.3% for the war ending by 2025. These discrepancies highlight the varying perspectives and the inherent uncertainty in predicting the conflict's end. Insight Prediction's market focuses on specific events such as surrender or the announcement of the end of military operations, rather than a general cessation of fighting, which further complicates the interpretation of these market estimates.
Key trends in prediction markets include:
Several factors are likely to influence whether the war ends in 2025:
Based on the available data, the probability of the Ukraine war ending in 2025 ranges from a low of 1.3% (Manifold Markets) to a high of 65% (Metaculus), with superforecaster estimates generally falling between 35% and 65%. The consensus among experts and prediction markets suggests a moderate probability, with a significant degree of uncertainty due to the complex interplay of military, economic, and political factors. The most likely range is between 35% and 65%, reflecting the potential for a resolution driven by economic exhaustion, international pressure, and potential battlefield innovations.
Estimating the probability of the Ukraine war ending in 2026 involves similar considerations as for 2025, but with a longer timeframe allowing for more significant shifts in the conflict's dynamics. While specific probabilities for 2026 are less frequently cited than for 2025, a general consensus suggests a higher likelihood of resolution by the end of 2026.
Superforecasters generally assign a higher probability to the war ending by the close of 2026, with estimates ranging from 55% to 80%. Good Judgment Inc. estimates a 75-80% probability that the war will end by the close of 2026. This increase in probability reflects the expectation that the cumulative effects of economic strain, military attrition, and international mediation efforts could force both parties to seek a resolution.
Key drivers influencing these estimates include:
Expert analyses also suggest a higher likelihood of the war ending by 2026. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) suggests a further 20% chance of resolution in 2026, in addition to the 60% chance for 2025. This implies a cumulative probability of 80% by the end of 2026. While specific analyses for 2026 are less common, the general trend is that the longer the conflict continues, the more likely a resolution becomes due to the increasing strain on both sides.
Key expert insights include:
Prediction markets also reflect a higher probability of the war ending by 2026. Metaculus estimates an 85% chance of resolution by the end of 2026. This higher probability reflects the expectation that prolonged conflict will exhaust both parties and increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. However, it's important to note that specific market estimates for 2026 are less common than for 2025, and the available data is less granular.
Key trends in prediction markets include:
Several factors are likely to influence whether the war ends in 2026:
Based on the available data, the probability of the Ukraine war ending in 2026 is generally higher than for 2025, with estimates ranging from 55% to 85%. The consensus among superforecasters, experts, and prediction markets suggests a significant likelihood of resolution by the end of 2026, driven by the cumulative effects of economic strain, military attrition, and international mediation efforts. The most likely range is between 75% and 80%, reflecting the expectation that prolonged conflict will become unsustainable for both sides.
Despite the various estimates and analyses, there is a general consensus that the war could potentially end either in late 2025 or early 2026. However, the uncertainty and complexity of the conflict make precise predictions challenging. The ongoing nature of the war, with no significant breakthroughs on the battlefield, has led to discussions about potential negotiations and the long-term support needed for Ukraine. The continuation or end of the war is heavily influenced by external factors, including Western military aid, economic support, and the strategic initiatives of both Russia and Ukraine. These factors introduce significant variability in predicting the exact end date of the war.
The lack of clear breakthroughs on the battlefield, the dependence on external factors, and the potential for unforeseen events all contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the war's end. While the probabilities provided offer a useful framework for understanding the range of possible outcomes, it is essential to recognize that the situation remains fluid and contingent on numerous geopolitical and military factors.
In summary, the probability of the Ukraine war ending in 2025 is estimated to be between 35% and 65%, while the probability of resolution by 2026 is higher, ranging from 75% to 80%. These estimates are informed by analyses from superforecasters, experts, and prediction markets. The key variables influencing these probabilities include Western support, Russian domestic stability, the ability of both sides to sustain military operations, and the potential for diplomatic breakthroughs. The situation remains dynamic, and these probabilities should be viewed as a guide rather than a definitive prediction.
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